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The interactions between AFSJ and CFSP have become increasingly pronounced. They 
are also dynamic and subject to adjustment, and must be viewed in the context of the 
prevailing political climate in the EU. The intensity of these interactions has already 
had an impact on the character of the CFSP: the latter has moved closer to the soft end 
of the security spectrum and is being instrumentalized in order to enable the EU to 
achieve objectives of other policies. Whilst it prevents the scope of CFSP from being 
impinged upon by other policies, the limited, so far, case law of the Court of Justice 
on the relationship between CFSP and AFSJ does not provide a clear yardstick that 
would enable the institutions to address legal basis questions with confidence.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has a set of objectives that is 
startlingly broad. It includes the following: the absence of internal border controls for 
persons; the development of a common policy on asylum, immigration, and external 
border controls; a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat 
crime, racism and xenophobia; increased cooperation between police, judicial and 
other competent authorities; the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters 
and, if necessary, the approximation of criminal laws; the mutual recognition of 
judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil matters.1  
 It is not, however, only this broad sweep that makes the AFSJ well-suited for 
interacting with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It is also the security focus of these policies. 
Whilst focusing on EU citizens,2 AFSJ owes its genesis and development to the need 
to ensure the internal security of the European Union.3 Given the increasing 
multiplication of security challenges and the porous nature of physical borders, the 
development of the external aspects of AFSJ was hardly surprising.4 And given the 
broad scope of CFSP (it covers ‘all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to 
                                                     
1 Art. 67(2)-(4) TFEU. The AFSJ is governed by Title V TFEU, and covers immigration (Article 77 TFEU), 
asylum (Article 78 TFEU), judicial cooperation in civil (Article 81 TFEU) and criminal matters (Articles 
82-6 TFEU), and police cooperation (Articles 87-9 TFEU).   
2 Art. 3(2) TEU provides that the EU ‘shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice 
without internal frontiers’ (emphasis added).  
3 See, for instance, 'A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' 
COM(2005) 491 fin, adopted by the Council in December 2005.  
4 See J Monar, ‘The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice-Progress, 
potential and limitations after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (SIEPS 2012:1) 13ff.  
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the Union's security’5), it was only a matter of time before the linkages between it and 
AFSJ would emerge.  
 The linkages between the two policy areas are more explicit in the revamped 
framework that has governed the EU’s external action since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. The objective of ‘contribut[ing] to the protection of its citizens’ is 
viewed in Article 3(5) TEU as part of the Union’s aims in its relations with the wider 
world. More specifically, primary law refers to safeguarding, amongst others, the 
Union’s security as an objective not only of the EU’s external action (Article 21 (2) 
TEU), but also of the external aspects of its other policies (Article 24(3) TEU).  
 On the other hand, CFSP and AFSJ are ill-suited in legal terms. The former is 
covered by a sui generis competence of the EU (Article 2(4) TFEU) and ‘is subject to 
specific rules and procedures’ (Article 24(1) TEU), in the context of which unanimity 
prevails, the role of the European Parliament is marginal at best, and the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union is limited.6 As for the AFSJ, it is covered 
by shared competence (Article 4(2)(j) TFEU), the ordinary legislative procedure 
applies, the Parliament is acting as co-legislator, and the conduct of the policy is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.  
 In the light of the above, the CFSP-AFSJ nexus provides a good snapshot of the 
complexities that characterize the Union’s effort to bring together different stands of 
its external action in order to become a relevant actor on the international scene. This 
chapter will explore these complexities from three different angles. The first is about 
policy: it will focus on the increasingly prominent linkages that emerge from the 
current conception of CFSP/CSDP and AFSJ by the Union’s decision-makers. The 
second angle is about practice: it will explore how the nexus between the two policies 
works in CFSP practice, by focusing on its most direct and prominent illustration, that 
is Operation Sophia in the Southern Central Mediterranean. The third angle is about 
the approach of the Court of Justice to the CFSP-AFSJ nexus and its implications for 
both the Union’s institutions and the place of CFSP in the Union’s constitutional order.  
 
2. The policy angle   
 
The external dimension of AFSJ is, ostensibly, about the development of relationships 
between the EU and third countries and organizations in order to achieve the 
objectives relating to the Union’s internal security. This dimension was acknowledged 
as early as in 1999 by the European Council7 and has emerged clearly over the years 
on the basis of various policy documents.8 In fact, there is a plethora of policy 
                                                     
5 Art. 24(1) TEU.  
6 Art. 24(2) TEU and Art. 275 TFEU. On this issue, see the chapter by Hillion and Wessel. On the 
procedural aspects of CFSP/CSDP, see the chapter by Marquardt. 
7 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions on the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice 
(15-6 October 1999). 
8 For the foundational documents, see The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and 
Justice in the European Union [2005] OJ C 53/01, and The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure 
Europe serving and protecting the citizens (Brussels, 2 December 2009) adopted by the European Council 
(11-12 December 2009). See the analysis in T Balzacq (ed.), The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home 
Affairs – Governance, Neighbours, Security (Palgrave Macmillan 2009); M Cremona, J Monar and S Poli 
(eds), The External Dimensions of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (P.I.E. Peter 
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documents in the area, and they are by no means immune to the empty rhetoric, 
triteness and hyperbole that one is accustomed to find in this type of work produced 
by the EU’s bureaucracies and politicians. Taken together, nonetheless, these 
documents convey the prevailing understanding of the institutions about the 
increasing relevance of CFSP and AFSJ to each other.   
 The main priorities of the external dimension of AFSJ were defined early on as 
migration policy, the fight against organized crime and terrorism, the fight against 
crimes such as money laundering, corruption and trafficking in human beings, the 
fight against drug trafficking, and the development and consolidation of the rule of 
law in countries on the path to democracy.9 These issues also featured prominently in 
the main strategic documents on CFSP. The 2003 European Security Strategy, for 
instance, included organized crime in the Union’s major challenges, and referred 
specifically to cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, and illegal migrants, as well 
as their potential link to terrorism.10   
 In fact, the nexus between AFSJ and CFSP has been shaped by three interlinked 
aspects of the Union’s external relations in general and its foreign and security policy 
in particular. The first is the wide terms in which the EU has construed the notion of 
security. This characteristic has been prevalent in the efforts of the Union to articulate 
its international role. The tone was set in the 2003 European Security Strategy which 
referred to terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, 
state failure, as well as organised crime as the main global challenges for the EU.11 The 
policies covered by the AFSJ pertained to all them, and their role was affirmed in a 
2008 review of the European Security Strategy12 where, for instance, organized crime 
assumed central importance, alongside terrorism. This approach is also illustrated by 
the 2016 Global Strategy which stresses, in the context of CSDP, operations and 
missions aiming to fight cross-border crime and disrupt smuggling networks,13 a 
point that will be explored further in the following section.    
 The second characteristic, following from the above, pertains to the Union’s 
armoury to tackle global security challenges, and is about the wide range of 
instruments upon which the EU is prepared to rely. As the Global Strategy puts it, ‘[a] 
stronger Union requires investing in all dimensions of foreign policy, from research 
and climate to infrastructure and mobility, from trade and sanctions to diplomacy and 
development’.14 To that effect, it promotes an approach which would be ‘integrated’, 
‘multi-dimensional … through the use of all available policies and instruments aimed 
at conflict prevention, management and resolution’, ‘multi-phased’, that is involving 
                                                     
Lang 2011); C Flaesch-Mougin and L.S. Rossi (eds), La dimension extérieure de l'espace de liberté, de sécurité 
et de justice de l'Union (Bruylant 2012); and R Wessel and C Matera, ‘The External Dimension of the EU’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Security’ in C Eckes and T Konstadinides (eds), Crime within the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: A European Public Order (CUP 2011) 272. 
9 Santa Marie de Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000, Presidency Conclusions.  
10 'A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy' (Brussels, 12 December 2003) 4-5 
11 ibid, 3-5. 
12 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing 
World' (S407/08, Brussels, 11 December 2008). 
13 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s 
Foreign and Security Policy' (European External Action Service 2016).  
14 ibid, 44. 
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all stages of the conflict cycle, and ‘multi-level’, covering the local, national, regional 
and global levels.15 There are, in other words, inherent linkages between, amongst 
others, CFSP/CSDP and AFSJ. This is articulated clearly in the 2017 implementation 
report on the Global Strategy, which states the following:  
 
Security and defence are essential components for a credible EU role in the world. But 
the full strength and value of such instruments are fulfilled only when they are 
deployed alongside other external policies – such as enlargement, development and 
trade – or policies with external aspects, including on migration, energy, climate, 
environment, culture and more. This unique mix of actions is the European way to 
foreign and security policy.16 
 
The third characteristic of the Union’s international role is the osmotic relationship 
between internal and external policies. Again, this is a not a new development. The 
European Security Strategy referred to the internal and external aspects of security as 
‘indissolubly linked’17 and the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy pointed out the ‘need to improve the way in which we bring together 
internal and external dimensions’.18 There is greater emphasis on the internal-external 
linkages in the Global Strategy too, both generally and in relation to CFSP/CSDP in 
particular.19  
 The above three features of the Union’s security policy (broad definition, wide 
range of EU instruments, internal-external linkages) have shaped the nexus between 
CFSP/CSDP and AFSJ over the years. In fact, they have gone farther: so central to the 
Union’s external relations have they become that they are now viewed as emblematic 
of ‘the European way to foreign and security policy’.20 At a high policy level, we see 
the increasingly explicit articulation of the nexus between these policies and 
CFSP/CSDP. The Global Strategy, for instance, states that ‘[w]e will also make 
different external policies and instruments migration-sensitive – from diplomacy and 
CSDP to development and climate – and ensure their coherence with internal ones 
regarding border management, homeland security, asylum, employment, culture and 
education’.21  
                                                     
15 ibid, 28-9. 
16 'From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy - Year 1' (European 
External Action Service 2017) 12. 
17 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' (n 10) 2. 
18 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy' (n 12) 4. 
19 For instance: ‘through a coherent use of internal and external policies, the EU must counter the spill-
over of insecurity that may stem from . . . conflicts [where no peace agreements are reached], ranging 
from trafficking and smuggling to terrorism’: 'Shared Vision, Common Action' (n 13) 30. 
20 'Shared Vision, Common Action' (n 13) 12. The same rhetoric was also apparent in previous strategic 
documents: the ESS had pointed out that the EU was ‘particularly well equipped to respond to such 
multi-faceted situations’ (7), and the 2008 Report referred to ‘a distinctive European approach to foreign 
and security policy’ (2). This rhetoric is not confined to strategic documents on CFSP: references to a 
‘European Security Model’ are made in the 2010 Internal Security Strategy time and again, whereas 
'The European Agenda on Security' (Communication) COM (2015) 185 fin also refers to the EU’s added 
value in the area.  
21 'Shared Vision, Common Action' (n 13) 50. 
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 This point is also stressed in CFSP/CSDP-specific documents. In relation to one 
of the strategic priorities of the Global Strategy, that is protecting the Union and its 
citizens, the Council has recently elaborated on the significance of the nexus between 
AFSJ and CFSP/CSDP:  
 
Protecting the Union and its citizens covers the contribution that the EU and its 
Member States can make from a security and defence perspective, notably through 
CSDP in line with the Treaty, to tackle challenges and threats that have an impact on 
the security of the Union and its citizens, along the nexus of internal and external 
security, in cooperation with Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) actors. Respecting 
that CSDP missions and operations are deployed outside the Union, the EU can 
contribute from a security and defence perspective to strengthening the protection and 
resilience of its networks and critical infrastructure; the security of its external borders 
as well as building partners' capacity to manage their borders; civil protection and 
disaster response; ensuring stable access to and use of the global commons, including 
the high seas and space; countering hybrid threats; cyber security; preventing and 
countering terrorism and radicalisation; combatting people smuggling and trafficking; 
complementing, within the scope of CSDP, other EU efforts concerning irregular 
migration flows, in line with the October 2016 European Council Conclusions; 
promoting compliance with non-proliferation regimes and countering arms 
trafficking and organised crime. Existing EU policies in these areas should be taken 
forward in a comprehensive manner.22 
 
To be sure, the overview provided in this section relates to policy documents that, as 
mentioned above, are high on rhetoric and may not avoid being formulaic or trite in 
their language. They do, however, illustrate a central point: a fundamental congruence 
has emerged between CFSP and AFSJ objectives and is shaping the Union’s 
understanding of its foreign and security policy. In effect, the Treaty of Lisbon reflects 
this, as it defines more broadly the tasks to be carried out by the Union and draws 
upon the tasks undertaken under the AFSJ, a case in point being Article 43(1) TEU and 
its reference to the fight against terrorism. This point will be explored further in 
section 4 of this chapter.  
 The congruence of objectives between CFSP/CSDP and AFSJ is also reflected 
by practice. A case in point is provided by the active role of High Representative 
Mogherini in the negotiation of migration compacts with African states.23 Another 
example on the CSDP side is security sector reform (SSR), that is the process of 
transforming a third country’s security system in order to enable it to provide 
individuals and the state with effective and accountable security, consistent with 
respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good 
governance. SSR features prominently as part of the external dimension of AFSJ,24 
whilst objectives of the latter are also addressed by a number of the CSDP civilian 
                                                     
22 Council Conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence 
(14149/16, Brussels, 14 November 2016) 5.  
23 See, more generally, for a recent assessment: Commission, 'Fourth Progress Report on the Partnership 
Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration' COM (2017) 350 fin.  
24 See recently: 'Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform' JOIN 
(2016) 31 fin and, previously, 'A concept for European Community support for security sector reform' 
COM (2006) 253 fin. 
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missions which aim to reform the security sector of the host country in order to tackle, 
amongst others, smuggling, trafficking, and organised crime.25  
 The overall approach of such missions illustrates their linkages with the 
external aspects of AFSJ: it reflects a policy choice to tackle the issues that undermine, 
directly or potentially, the security of European citizens. The civilian mission in Niger 
(EUCAP Sahel Niger), for instance, was designed as ‘the intensification of terrorist 
actions and the consequences of the conflict in Libya have increased the urgency of 
protecting Union citizens and interests in the region and preventing the extension of 
those threats to the Union’.26  What we see, therefore, is the gradual anchoring of CSDP 
missions to AFSJ policies not only in relation to their objectives but also policy choices 
about where these missions are to be carried out. A considerable proportion of the 
CSDP civilian missions are launched in Africa, a region which is central to the Union’s 
AFSJ interests.27  
 A process, therefore, of interweaving policies and objectives emerges: whilst 
conceived of in different contexts originally, they develop gradually in an osmotic 
relationship with each other. This process has shaped the overall character of both the 
AFSJ and CFSP/CSDP. As far as the former is concerned, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to envisage an autonomous, readily defined and legally contained external 
policy on AFSJ. A look at the 2015 Strategic Guidelines on AFSJ, for instance, suggests 
an ever greater emphasis on the external aspects of the policy, on the synergies with 
other policies, and on the ever present requirement for a comprehensive approach.28  
 Put differently, the external dimension of AFSJ can only be designed properly 
and carried out in conjunction with other external policies, including CFSP and CSDP. 
On the other hand, the increasing interactions with other policies, including AFSJ and 
development cooperation,29 have had a profound impact on the shape of CFSP and 
CSDP: they have shifted the policy farther away from the hard end of the security 
spectrum set out in the Treaties,30 and have underlined its instrumental dimension, as 
they have rendered it an essential element for achieving the objectives of other 
policies.31 While this section suggested that this development has emerged as a matter 
                                                     
25 See G Mournier, ‘Civilian Crisis Management and the External Dimension of JHA: Inceptive, 
Functional and Institutional Similarities’ (2009) 31 Journal of European Integration 45. For an overview of 
the civilian missions, see the chapter by Juncos. See also the analysis in P Koutrakos, The EU Common 
Security and Defence Policy (OUP 2013) ch 6. 
26 Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP [2012] OJ L187/47, recital 1, last amended by Council Decision 
2017/1253 [2017] OJ L179/15. 
27 See 'EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development' COM 
(2005) 489 fin. 
28 European Council Conclusions, Strategic Guidelines for the area of freedom, security and justice (EUCO 
79/4, Brussels, 27 June 2014).  
29 See H Merket, The EU and the Security-Development Nexus – Bridging the Legal Divide (Brill/Nijhoff 
2016), and the chapter by Broberg in this book. 
30 Art. 42(1) TEU refers to ‘missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and 
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter’, 
whereas Article 43(1) TEU defines these tasks by reference to joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict 
stabilisation.  
31 For an analysis of the CSDP record that supports this argument, see Koutrakos (n 25), Chs 5-6.  
 7 
of policy, the following section will show that it is also prevalent as a matter of 
practice.     
 At this juncture, suffice it to say that it is not one-dimensional: it is not only the 
CFSP/CSDP and AFSJ whose direction has changed due to their interactions. The 
widening of the notion of security has enhanced the interactions between other 
external policies of the Union, and has had implications for their direction too. There 
is, for instance, a healthy debate about the securitization of development cooperation32 
and the increasing emphasis in the EU’s development cooperation on serving 
objectives related to the Union’s own interests.33  
 
3. The practice angle  
 
Given the focus of this book, this section will approach the practice of the CFSP-AFSJ 
nexus from the CFSP point of view. As an overview of the CSDP civilian and military 
operations is provided elsewhere in this book,34 the aim of this section will be 
selective, namely to tease out the issues raised by the interactions with AFSJ in 
practice. The starting point for this exercise will be Operation EUNAVFOR MED 
Sophia in the Southern Central Mediterranean.  There are various reasons for this. 
From a wider CSDP perspective, the operation consolidates the maritime dimension 
of the policy, as it follows from Operation Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden.35 It also 
provides a clear example of the nexus between CSDP and AFSJ, both in terms of its 
objectives as well as its conduct. Finally, it is an ongoing operation that is carried out 
in the Union’s neighbourhood36 and deals with an issue of profound political 
significance for the EU and sensitivity for the Member States.  
 The decision to carry out the operation was taken in May 2015, following the 
growing number of migrants drowning in the Mediterranean in their effort to reach 
an EU Member State (mainly from Libya to Italy). In the first 4.5 months of 2015, 
almost 1800 deaths had been reported, according to the International Organization for 
Migration.37 The stream of terrible news and pictures from the Mediterranean made 
the EU institutions react. The European Council, at an extraordinary meeting, 
                                                     
32 See, amongst others, M Duffield, ‘The Liberal Way of Development and the Development-Security 
Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide’ (2010) 41 Security Dialogue 53; B Hettne, 
‘Development and Security: Origins and Future’ (2010) 41 Security Dialogue 31; S Keukeleire and K 
Raube, ‘The security-development nexus and securitization in the EU’s policies towards developing 
countries’ (2013) 26 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 556; J Orbie and K Del Biondo, ‘The 
European Union’s “Comprehensive Approach” in Chad: Securitisation and/or 
Compartmentalisation?’ (2015) 29 Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations 243.  
33 This point is made by Broberg in his contribution to this volume. Whilst this emphasis emerges most 
clearly in The New European Consensus on Development – Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future (Brussels, 7 
June 2017), he suggests that it has characterized the EU’s development cooperation policy for some 
time.  
34 See the chapters in this volume by Fiott on military operations and Juncos on civilian missions.  
35 For the legal issues related to Operation Atalanta, see R Gosalbo Bono and S Boelaert, ‘Piracy and the 
European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy’ in P Koutrakos and A Skordas (eds), The Law 
and Practice of Piracy at Sea (Hart Publishing 2014).  
36 See the chapter by Blockmans in this book. 
37 <http://www.iom.int/news/iom-monitors-migrant-arrivals-deaths-mediterranean> (last checked 
on 2 August 2017). 
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expressed its indignation,38 the Commission proposed a revamped system of 
managing migration flows whilst seeking to avert disasters at sea,39 and the Council 
decided to carry out EUNAVFOR MED in the context of the EU’s CSDP.40   
 The operation was launched in June 2015,41 and its core task is to ‘contribut[e] 
to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks 
in the Southern Central Mediterranean … by undertaking systematic efforts to 
identify, capture and dispose of vessels and assets used or suspected of being used by 
smugglers or traffickers’.42  The operation is designed to cover three sequential sets of 
activities. The first lasted for a few months and was about information gathering and 
patrolling on the high seas in order to support the detection and monitoring of 
migration networks. The second is more substantial and is about boarding, search, 
seizure, and diversion of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or 
trafficking. This was envisaged to take place, first, on high seas and, subsequently, in 
the territorial and internal waters of the coastal state. It has only been on the high seas 
that Operation Sophia has extended so far, since September 2015.43 The third phase 
will be about ‘all necessary measures against a vessel and related assets, including 
through disposing of them or rendering them inoperable, which are suspected of 
being used for human smuggling or trafficking’ in the territory of the coastal state.44 
 A year after Operation Sophia had been launched, two supporting tasks were 
added: capacity building and training of, and information sharing with, the Libyan 
coastguard and navy, and contributing to the implementation of the United Nations 
arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya by information-sharing and 
implementation.45 The Union started engaging in them in September 2016.46 The 
training of the Libyan coastguard takes place at sea, in EU Member States training 
facilities or in Libya, and on board Libyan coastguard and navy patrol boats. 
 The objectives of Operation Sophia could not illustrate the linkages between 
CFSP/CSDP and AFSJ any more clearly. On the one hand, setting out the policy 
context within which the Operation would be launched, Decision 2015/778 refers 
prominently to the European Council’s commitment ‘to strengthening the Union’s 
presence at sea, to preventing illegal migration flows and to reinforcing internal 
solidarity and responsibility’.47 On the other hand, the operation is viewed as a case-
study of the CFSP-AFSJ nexus in strategic documents on migration: this was the case 
                                                     
38 European Council, special meeting, 23 April 2015, Statement, para 2.  
39 Commission, 'A European Agenda for Migration' COM (2015) 24 final.   
40 Council Decision 2015/778 [2015] OJ L122/31. The operation has been extended until the end of 2018 
(Council Dec. 2017/1385 [2017] OJ L194/61. The operation was named Sophia pursuant to Council Dec. 
2015/1926 [2015] OJ L281/13.  
41 Council Dec. 2015/972 [2015] OJ L157/51. 
42 Art. 1(1), Council Decision 2015/778 (n 37). 
43 PSC Dec. 2015/1772 [2015] OJ L258/5, enhanced by PSC Dec. 2016/118 [2016] OJ L26/63. 
44 Article 2(2)(c), Council Decision 2015/778 (n 37). 
45 Council Dec. 2016/993 [2016] OJ L162/18. 
46 PSC Dec. 2016/1635 [2016] OJ L243/11 and PSC Dec. 2016/1637 [2016] OJ L243/14. 
47 Recital 2, Art. 1(1), Council Decision 2015/778 (n 37). It has been argued that the legal basis for the 
Decision should have included an AFSJ legal basis too: M Estrada-Canamares, ‘Operation Sophia before 
and after UN Security Council Resolution No 2240(2015)’ (2016) European Papers 185, 190.  
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not only at the time of its inception,48 but also in the more recent documents.49 In other 
words, Operation Sophia appears emerges as a CSDP military operation  with AFSJ 
aims.  
 The legal acts governing EUNAVFOR MED Sophia stress its anchoring in 
international law, in terms of the design and the conduct of the operation. Both the 
core task (for instance operating on the high seas) and the supporting tasks (for 
instance contributing to the implementation of the arms embargo) are linked to 
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.50 The conduct of the operation is 
also framed closely in terms of various international law instruments, including the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.51 It is also on international law 
grounds that the operation has not been carried out yet in the territorial or internal 
waters of Libya, given the absence of an authorization to that effect by the United 
Nations or of Libya’s consent.52 
 In practical terms, the impact of Operation Sophia has been seriously contested. 
In terms of its core task, it appears to have had little effect in deterring migrant flows,53 
as the people smugglers have adjusted their business model. A report by the respected 
European Union Committee of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom has 
referred to Operation Sophia as ‘a failed mission’.54   
 There are two main considerations in assessing the role of the operation. The 
first is the policy context within which it is designed and carried out. The area covered 
by the operation vessels is used for migrants from a range of source and transit African 
countries, including Gambia, Chad, Niger and Mali.55 The conditions that have given 
rise to and the size of this migration movement have created a policy challenge which 
the limited resources and narrow mandate of the operation are manifestly unsuited to 
tackle.56 The deep roots of the problem have been acknowledged by the High 
                                                     
48 See Commission, 'A European Agenda for Migration' (n 39).   
49 See 'Joint Communication on Migration on the Central Mediterranean route – Managing flows, 
saving lives' JOIN (2017) 04 fin, and the Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on 
the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route (3 February 2017). 
50 See, for instance, UNSCR 2240 (2015) for the former and UNSCR 2292 (2016) for the latter.  
51 Along with the 2000 Protocols against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life and Sea, the 1979 international Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue (SAR), the 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Marine International Convention on 
Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention), and the 1951 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 
52 When the decision to carry out Operation Sophia was taken, a spokesman for the Libyan Government 
characterized it as ‘not … humane’ and stated that the ‘government will not accept any violation of 
Libyan sovereignty’ and ‘will not accept the plan unless it’s co-ordinated’ with his government 
(https://euobserver.com/justice/1287540) (last accessed on 3 August 2017).  
53 The number of migrants arriving in Italy by sea in the first half of 2017 was 17% higher than that over 
the same period in 2016: The Economist, July 22nd, 2017, p29. 
54 House of Lords European Union Committee 2nd Report of Session 2017-19 Operation Sophia: a failed 
mission (12 July 2017). 
55 The Financial Times, 1 August 2017 p (J Politi, ‘Migration opens the door to Italy’s populists). 
56 The Operation currently has access to six ships, three helicopters, and four aircraft: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eunavfor_med_-_mission_19_june_2017_en.pdf (last 
accessed on 3 August 2017).  
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Representative and the Commission themselves: ‘[although migration has always 
taken place, this appears to be a structural movement from Sub-Saharan Africa and 
there is no indication these trends could change until the economic and 
political/security situation in the countries of origin improves’.57 This is not the only 
issue that renders the situation in Libya so difficult, given security concerns about the 
country becoming a central hub for terrorists, and energy security concerns 
considering its oil and gas resources.  
 Viewed from this angle, Operation Sophia appears to be making, at best, quite 
a small contribution to addressing a big and complex problem the causes of which are 
both long-standing and multifarious. In doing so, it is not alone, as most other CSDP 
operations have had similar effects.58 To be sure, as it is but a part of a comprehensive 
approach, the operation and its effectiveness need to be assessed in the light of the 
broader contribution of the Union in the area. On that front too, however, we find the 
pathologies of the EU’s foreign and security policy in evidence. For instance, the civil 
war and the ensuing instability in Libya have been an inherent cause of the problem 
that the operation has been seeking to tackle as well as an inherent constraint on the 
impact of the EU’s intervention in the area.59 In July 2017, the French President 
Emmanuel Macron brokered a deal between the Head of the UN-recognised Libyan 
Government and the leader of the so-called Libyan National Army that controls large 
tracts of Libyan territory. At the same time, the Italian Government discussed with the 
UN-recognized Government a plan about an operation in Libyan waters by the Italian 
navy aiming to help intercept migrant ships. The absence of an EU role in these 
initiatives was striking. Again, this is entirely consistent with the overall pattern of the 
CFSP in the area, as the Member States act at will on issues that matter to them, and 
the EU follows by relying upon limited resources in order to pursue a narrow 
mandate. It is recalled, for instance, that the 2011 military operation against Libya was 
carried out by a coalition of states, led by the United Kingdom and France, whilst the 
EU was absent.   
 The second issue raised by the operation is about protection of fundamental 
human rights. On the one hand, there are grave concerns about the extent to which 
the Libyan coastguard and navy comply with such rights in the exercise of their 
duties.60 On the other hand, there are well-documented reports, including by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, about the treatment of migrants in Libya according 
to which there is a high risk of serious human rights violations.61 These issues have 
                                                     
57 JOIN (2017) 04 fin Joint Communication on Migration on the Central Mediterranean route – Managing flows, 
saving lives (Brussels, 25 January 2017) p4.  
58 See P Koutrakos, n25 above, Ch. 5. See also the analysis in the chapter by Fiott in this book.  
59 See EEAS, Strategic Review on EUBAM Libya, EUNAVFOR MED Op Sophia & EU Liaison and 
Planning Cell (9202/17, Brussels, 15 May 2017). 
60 See UN Support Mission in Libya and UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Detained 
and Dehumanised’ Report on human rights abuse against migrants in Libya (13 December 2016) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf)> accessed 
3 August 2017. 
61 See UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya - Update I (October 2015): 
<http://www.refworld.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=publisher&docid=561cd8804&skip=0&
publisher=UNHCR&querysi=libya&searchin=title&sort=date> accessed 3 August 2017. See also, more 
recently <http://www.dw.com/en/un-slams-eu-over-brutality-migrants-face-in-libya/a-40426092> 
accessed 17 September 2017. 
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been acknowledged by High Representative Mogherini herself.62 As the  capacity-
building and training of the Libyan coastguard and navy are about enabling them to 
carry out interceptions and then return to Libyan soil, the question arises as to whether 
the ultimate protection of fundamental human rights is secondary to the central aim 
of Operation Sophia, namely to buttress the EU from the current influx of migrants.63  
 Given the various references to international law in the Council and Political 
Security Committee’s documents governing the Operation, and the legal issues raised 
above, it is no surprise that law features prominently in the six-monthly reports by the 
EU Commander.64 This is not just in terms of the mandate of the operation, i.e. the 
legal conditions that would need to be met for its staff to be able to operate in the 
Libyan territorial waters. In fact, these documents suggest an acute awareness of the 
international and human rights issues raised by the conduct of both by the mission 
staff and the Libyan officers trained by them. They also suggest an awareness of the 
situation in Libya and the legal problems that these raise for the mission staff in terms 
of the application of the principle of non-refoulement.65 Given the important and open 
questions that pertain to the everyday conduct of the Operation, it is somewhat ironic 
that the EUNAVFOR Commander would have had to remind the EU and its Member 
States of the urgent need to have the post of a legal assistant filled.66  
 Operation Sophia provides a snapshot of the intensity with which AFSJ 
objectives have penetrated CSDP and the policy and legal issues that this development 
raises in the design and conduct of the policy. It also illustrates in practical terms the 
point made above in Section 3 about the impact that the interactions with AFSJ have 
on the character of CSDP: the needle has been moved away from the hard end of the 
security spectrum, and CSDP has been instrumentalized in order to carry out 
objectives of other EU policies. In fact, we see this development in other aspects of 
CSDP which are not related to migration. For instance, in the context of the rule of law 
mission in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS), quite early on in the life of CSDP, the security 
contribution that the Union made was at odds with the Georgian Government’s 
                                                     
62 Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament plenary session on the recent 
developments in migration (Brussels, 12 September 2017) 
<https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/32002/speech-hrvp-federica-
mogherini-european-parliament-plenary-session-recent-developments_en)> accessed 17 September 
2017. 
63 This is a point is also raised about the core task of Operation Sophia in Libya’s territorial waters:  see 
P Strauch, ‘When Stopping the Smuggler Means Repelling the Refugee: International Human Rights 
Law and the European Union’s Operation To Combat Smuggling in Libya’s Territorial Sea’ (2016) 126 
Yale Law Journal 2421. For the broader issues, see V Moreno-Lax and E Papastavridis (eds), Boat Refugees 
and Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Maritime Security with Human Rights 
(Brill/Nijhoff 2017).  
64 These have been leaked and are available online (for instance, on statewatch.org).  
65 See the reports by the Operation Commander covering the period between 1 January and 31 October 
2016, dated 15 November 2016, 23 <http://statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/eu-council-eunavformed-
jan-oct-2016-report-restricted.pdf)> accessed3 August 2017, and the period between 22 June-31 
December 2015, dated 25 January 2016, 29 <https://wikileaks.org/eu-military-refugees/EEAS/EEAS-
2016-126.pdf> accessed 3 August 2017. 
66 See the report covering the period between 22 June-31 December 2015, dated 25 January 2016, 9 
<https://wikileaks.org/eu-military-refugees/EEAS/EEAS-2016-126.pdf> accessed 3 August 2017. 
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expectations about more traditional and hard security.67 The position of organized 
crime at the centre of the Union’s understanding of order in its missions in Bosnia was 
received in a similar manner.68 And it is not only the CFSP that has found its character 
affected by interacting with AFSJ. In fact, the impact of the CFSP-AFSJ nexus works 
both ways. A case in the point is the operation of the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency (Frontex) in the eastern Mediterranean in order to stave off migration 
mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. It is this blurring of operational 
mandates and objectives that have given rise to a healthy debate about the 
increasingly prominent security dimension of the external aspects of AFSJ.69  
 
4. The judicial approach  
 
The analysis so far has focused on the development of the linkages between CFSP and 
AFSJ as a matter of policy and their impact in practice. The intensity of these linkages 
raises questions about the legal basis of EU measures whose objectives straddle the 
policy areas. Given the distinct characteristics of the sets of rules and procedures 
governing these policy areas, the legal basis disputes are significant not only for the 
regulation of the activities undertaken by the Union, but also for the overall 
constitutional order of the EU. After all, the choice of legal basis is of constitutional 
significance, given that it indicates compliance with the principle of limited powers, 
enshrined in Article 5 TEU, and determines the nature and extent of the Union’s 
competence.70  
 As far as international agreements are concerned, the legal basis question about 
CFSP and AFSJ have been raised in two cases. In the first case, it was raised indirectly. 
This was in Case C-658/11 European Parliament v Council about the conclusion of the 
agreement between the EU and Mauritius on the transfer of individuals suspected of 
piracy at sea to Mauritius authorities by EU personnel.71 The agreement was 
concluded in the context of the anti-piracy Operation Atalanta. Rather than 
challenging the substantive legal basis of the conclusion of the agreement, the 
Parliament accepted that the latter was predominantly about CFSP. It argued, 
however, that, in the light of the incidental implications of the agreement for judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, police cooperation, and development cooperation, its 
consent was required pursuant to Article 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU. The Grand Chamber of 
                                                     
67 See L di Puppo, ‘The Externalization of JHA Policies in Georgia: Partner or Hotbed of Threats?’ (2009) 
31 European Integration 103.   
68 See A Juncos, ‘Of Cops and Robbers: the EU and the Problem of Organized Crime in Bosnia’ in B 
Balamir-Coskun and B Demirtas-Coskun (eds), Neighborhood Challenge: The European Union and its 
Neighbours (Universal Publishers 2009). 
69 In relation to, for instance, the Mobility Partnerships, see P Seeberg, ‘Mobility Partnerships and 
Security Subcomplexes in the Mediterranean: The Strategic Role of Migration and the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policies Towards the MENA Region’ (2017) 22 European Foreign Affairs 
Review 91. More generally, see C Matera, ‘An external dimension of the AFSJ? Some reflections on the 
nature and scope of the externalisation of the AFSJ domain’ in M Fletcher, E Herlin-Karnell and C 
Matera (eds), The European Union as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Routledge 2017). 
70 Opinion 2/00 EU:C:2001:664, para. 5. On legal basis disputes, see P Koutrakos, ‘Legal Basis and 
Delimitation of Competence in EU External Relations’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign 
Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart Publishing 2008). 
71 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025. 
 13 
the Court rejected this argument: without questioning Article 37 TEU as the proper 
legal basis for the conclusion of the Agreement, it held that it is the substantive legal 
basis that determines the type of procedure applicable under Article 218 TFEU.    
 The legal basis question was raised directly in Case C-263/14 European 
Parliament v Council about the EU-Tanzania transfer agreement, also concluded in the 
context of Operation Atalanta.72 In addition to the CFSP legal basis (Article 37 TEU), 
should it have been concluded under Article 82 TFEU (judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters) and Article 87 TFEU (police cooperation) too? The Grand Chamber of the 
Court answered in the negative. It held that the agreement was ‘intimately linked’ to 
Operation Atalanta, as it set up a mechanism which constituted ‘an essential element 
in the effective realisation of the objectives’ of the operation.73 The agreement would 
be devoid of purpose, were it not for the operation. The agreement, therefore, pursued 
the objectives of the CSDP operation, namely to preserve international peace and 
security and, therefore, fell predominantly within the scope of the CFSP.  
 In the EU-Tanzania judgment, the Court did not attempt to provide an abstract 
definition of either security and defence policy or judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and police cooperation. Instead, its line of reasoning was firmly anchored in 
the intrinsic linkages between the contested measure and the specific policy context 
within which it was adopted. In doing so, the Court did not follow the approach 
articulated by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion,74 and which had also been set 
out earlier by Advocate General Bot in the EU-Mauritius case.75 That approach had 
distinguished between international security (outside the territory of the EU) and 
internal security (within the EU): the former was covered by CFSP/CSDP, whereas 
the latter by AFSJ. By focusing, instead, on the links between the Agreement and the 
CSDP Operation in the context of which it was concluded, the Court avoided the 
complex task of distinguishing between international and EU security and defining 
the scope of both. 
 It is instructive to see how the Court has dealt with the legal basis issues raised 
by the CFSP-AFSJ nexus in another context, that is sanctions.76 On the one hand, 
following a CFSP measure that determines the need for the EU to impose sanctions, 
Article 215 TFEU provides for their imposition on natural or legal persons by means 
of a Council measure adopted by qualified majority. On the other hand, the Council 
also has the power under Article 75 TFEU to restrict capital movements, for instance 
by freezing assets of private or legal persons, in order to pursue the AFSJ objectives 
laid down in Article 67 TFEU. This power is exercised on the basis of the ordinary 
legislative procedure. In Case C-130/10 Parliament v Council (Smart sanctions), the 
question arose whether freezing financial assets of individuals suspected of financing 
international terrorism was an AFSJ matter or one that fell within the scope of CFSP 
and, subsequently, Article 215 TFEU.77  
                                                     
72 ECLI:EU:C:2016:435. 
73 ibid, para 51. 
74 ECLI:EU:C:2015:729, paras 63ff. 
75 EU:C:2014:41, paras 80ff. 
76 On the practice of EU sanctions, see the chapter by Eckes in this book.   
77 EU:C:2012:472. 
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 The Grand Chamber decided that it was the latter. Having pointed out that the 
procedural differences governing the relevant rules prevented the adoption of anti-
terrorist sanctions pursuant to both Article 216 TFEU and AFSJ provisions, the Court 
focused on the objectives of such measures:  
 
While admittedly the combating of terrorism and its financing may well be among the 
objectives of the area of freedom, security and justice, as they appear in Article 3(2) 
TEU, the objective of combating international terrorism and its financing in order to 
preserve international peace and security corresponds, nevertheless, to the objectives 
of the Treaty provisions on external action by the Union.78  
 
This conclusion was backed up by reference not only to the general objectives of what 
the EU does in the world (Article 21(2)(c) TEU includes the strengthening 
international security in the Union’s external action objectives), but also to the specific 
scope of CFSP (Article 24(1) TEU brings ‘all areas of foreign policy and all questions 
relating to the Union’s security’ within CFSP competence). The Court accepts that 
terrorism constitutes a threat to peace and international security and that, therefore, 
combating it may well be the object of CFSP action, especially given the reference to 
the fight against terrorism in Article 43(1) TFEU.  
 There is a thread that brings together the judgments in the Smart sanctions and 
the EU-Tanzania cases, and it suggests a reluctance by the Court to impinge upon the 
CFSP policy in order to enhance other EU policies. In both cases, the scope of CFSP is 
protected and the competence of the Union safeguarded. To that effect, the reference 
in the Smart Sanctions judgment to Article 24(1) TEU and the almost unlimited scope 
of the policy is noteworthy. This approach is in contrast to the pre-Lisbon judgment 
in ECOWAS where the Court had enhanced the scope of development cooperation 
policy at the expense of CFSP.79 Given the new constitutional configuration of the EU 
legal order and the amendment of Article 40 TEU which places the CFSP on an equal 
footing to the other EU policies,80 this approach is welcome. In fact, Cremona argues 
that the case law examined in this section illustrates the Court’s acceptance of the 
integration of CFSP/CSDP within the EU’s constitutional order.81  
 Whilst the EU-Tanzania and Smart sanctions judgments illustrate the same 
overall approach to CFSP, their line of reasoning differs. The former is based on the 
firm anchoring of the contested act (the transfer agreement) in its specific policy 
context (the CSDP operation which it was designed to facilitate). The latter, however, 
is more obscure. It appears to focus on the international dimension and genesis of the 
contested measures. As the Court put it in Smart sanctions, the objectives of Article 215 
TFEU, as a bridge with CFSP, and AFSJ, ‘although complementary, do not have the 
same scope’.82 The judgment, however, does not rely expressly on a distinction 
                                                     
78 ibid, para 61. 
79 Case C-91/05 Commission v Council EU:C:2008:288. See the comments in C Hillion and R Wessel, 
‘Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after ECOWAS: Clarification or Continued 
Fuzziness’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 551 and the criticism in Koutrakos (n 25) 231-244. 
80 This provision is mentioned expressly by AG Bot in his Opinion in Case C-130/10 Parliament v Council 
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81 See her chapter in this volume.  
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between internal and external security which would assign the former to AFSJ and 
the latter to CFSP. Instead, it appears to suggest that, from a substantive point of view, 
once the EU institutions chose to tackle terrorism by relying upon CFSP, the broad 
scope of the latter and the external action objectives set out in Article 21 TEU would 
render recourse to AFSJ redundant.   
 Where does this all leave us? Whilst carrying the authority of the Grand 
Chamber, the case law on the CFSP-AFSJ nexus is of limited volume and has been 
rendered in a narrow legal context. In the Smart sanctions case, the contested measures 
amended previous sanctions that had been adopted in the light of United Nations 
Security Council resolutions, a factor that highlighted the international security 
dimension of the measures. In the EU-Tanzania case, the intrinsic linkages between the 
contested agreement and the CSDP operation which it was designed to facilitate made 
general pronouncements about the AFSJ-CFSP objectives and their constitutional 
ramifications unnecessary. Put differently, the narrow legal and policy context of the 
case provided the Court with sufficient grounds to address the specific dispute.83  
 Viewed from this angle, the case law examined in this section safeguards the 
scope and role of CFSP within the Union’s constitutional order, but does not take us 
much farther. We are not much clearer as to how to determine, as a matter of principle, 
the appropriate legal basis of an EU measure in the light of the complementary 
objectives of CFSP and AFSJ. The greater the osmosis between the two policies, the 
greater the ambiguity that surrounds the legal choices that the institutions would have 
to make.  
 This is, of course, not a problem confined to these two policies. The relationship 
between development cooperation and CFSP is another example of interacting 
policies the conduct of which raises similar questions for the Union’s institutions.84 It 
is also not explained solely due to the inherent characteristics of CFSP and AFSJ. After 
all, the revamping of the external action framework at Lisbon and the provision of a 
set of horizontal objectives in Article 21(2) TEU for all external policies have added 
another layer of complexity to the legal organization of the EU’s external action.85 In 
a different context, the post-Lisbon changes are reflected in the richer conception of 
the Common Commercial Policy articulated in Opinion 2/15 on the Free Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and Singapore.86 The intensity, however, of 
the CFSP-AFSJ nexus highlights further the difficulties that we face in navigating the 
complex legal landscape of the Union’s external action.    
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has made three main arguments. First, the interactions between CFSP 
and AFSJ have become increasingly pronounced and their nexus central to the EU’s 
understanding of how best to tackle the main policy challenges that it faces. Second, 
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the intensity of these interactions has had an impact on the character of the policies. 
The CFSP, in particular, has moved closer to the soft end of the security spectrum and 
is being instrumentalized in order to enable the EU to achieve objectives of other 
policies. Third, whilst it prevents the scope of CFSP from being impinged upon by 
other policies, the limited, so far, case law of the Court of Justice on the relationship 
between CFSP and AFSJ does not provide a clear yardstick that would enable the 
institutions to address legal basis questions with confidence.  
 There is also another, broader, point to make about the CFSP-AFSJ nexus: 
whilst it has had an impact on the character and conduct of both policies, the nature 
of the nexus itself is dynamic and subject to adjustment. After all, the objectives of the 
AFSJ are about ongoing problems that have assumed almost existential dimensions 
for the EU.87 Similarly, and following the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the 
European Union, there has been movement about the pace of the development of 
CSDP, regarding, in particular, the issue of capabilities.88 The shape of the 
relationship, therefore, between CFSP and AFSJ may not be viewed in isolation from 
the prevailing political climate in the EU. In fact, it is bound to be affected by the 
ensuing policy adjustments in which the decision-making institutions would decide 
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